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Abstract
AI artificial intelligence brings about new quantitative techniques to assess the state
of an economy. Here we describe a new measure for systemic risk: the Financial
Risk Meter (FRM). This measure is based on the penalization parameter (λ) of a
linear quantile lasso regression. The FRM is calculated by taking the average of the
penalization parameters over the 100 largest US publicly traded financial institu-
tions. We demonstrate the suitability of this AI based risk measure by comparing
the proposed FRM to other measures for systemic risk, such as VIX, SRISK and
Google Trends. We find that mutual Granger causality exists between the FRM
and these measures, which indicates the validity of the FRM as a systemic risk
measure. The implementation of this project is carried out using parallel com-
puting, the codes are published on www.quantlet.de with keyword FRM. The
R package RiskAnalytics is another tool with the purpose of integrating and fa-
cilitating the research, calculation and analysis methods around the FRM project.
The visualization and the up-to-date FRM can be found on hu.berlin/frm.
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1 Introduction
Systemic risk is hazardous for the stability of financial markets, since the failure of one
firm may impact the stability of the whole system. There are various definitions of
systemic risk. One of the most popular definitions is introduced in Schwarcz (2008).
He defined systemic risk as a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional
failure, causing a chain of bad economic consequences, sometimes referred to as domino
effect. This definition indicates that interlinkages and interdependencies in a system or
market are very crucial for controlling systemic risk. The financial crisis in 2008 is an
example. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, several more financial cooperations
bankrupted as a result of their interlinkages with Lehman Brothers. Consequently, there
has been a surge in the interest in measuring and controlling systemic risk since the 2008
crisis, which has led to an increase in the research on this topic.
Several methodologies for measuring systemic risk have been proposed. Adrian and Brun-
nermeier (2016) proposed CoVaR, the value at risk of financial institutions conditional
on the other institutions being under distress, which uses two linear quantile regressions.
Hautsch et al. (2015) refined this algorithm by introducing linear quantile lasso regres-
sion with a fixed penalization parameter λ for each company to select the relevant risk
drivers. Fan et al. (2016) and Härdle et al. (2016) use a nonlinear Single Index Model
(SIM) combined with a variable selection technique to select risk factors. In their applica-
tion, they use data on 200 financial companies and 7 macro variables to estimate CoVaR.
During the estimation procedure, a time-varying penalization parameter λ is generated.
This series has a striking pattern: higher values correspond to financial crisis times and
lower values correspond to stable periods. This observation has led to the idea to use the
penalization parameter λ itself as a measure for systemic risk. The time-varying feature
is not observed in Hautsch et al. (2015), who applied a fixed λ for each firm, and not
time varying.
Fan et al. (2016) provide the λ series for single companies. In contrast, we would like to
see the overall behavior of λ. Härdle et al. (2016) compare the linear quantile lasso model
and SIM, and conclude that SIM is more suited than the linear model, but that the linear
quantile lasso model is also valid in terms of backtesting. Indeed if one generates λ series
for 100 firms with more than 300 observations each, then the application of SIM is not
realistic. Since linear quantile lasso is easier to apply and time saving, we decided to use
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it to compute the FRM.
We use log return data from the 100 largest US publicly traded financial institutions
as well as 6 macro variables. Our model is based on daily log returns of these financial
institutions. The time period under consideration runs from April 5, 2007 until September
23, 2016 and covers several documented financial crises (2008, 2011). We observe that
the pattern of this risk measure is more informative on financial risk. The shape and
volatility of the series correspond to the market volatility and financial events with a
large impact on systemic risk are clearly visible. Therefore, this series of averaged λ may
be called a Financial Risk Meter (FRM). Zbonakova et al. (2017) apply linear quantile
lasso regression to analyze the behavior of the λ series. They find that λ is sensitive
to the changes of volatility, which provide the theoretical evidence for the FRM to be a
systemic risk measure, as high volatility indicates high risk.
We introduce the methodology of the FRM, describe the risk levels, the computational
implementation as well as possible visualizations. We compare the FRM with other
systemic risk measures, such as VIX (Hallett, 2009), SRISK (see Brownlees and Engle,
2016) as well as the Google trends of key words related to financial crises (see Preis et al.,
2013). We find that the FRM and these risk measures mutually Granger cause, which
indicates the validity of the FRM as a systemic risk measure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the methodology used to
construct our FRM, which is quantile lasso modeling, is presented. Section 3 presents the
data, computational challenge and the visualization of the results. Section 4 shows the
validity of our FRM as a measure for financial risk by comparing with other financial risk
measures. Section 5 concludes, the financial institutions applied in this paper is listed in
Section 6 Appendix. All the R programs for this paper can be found on www.quantlet.de
(Borke and Härdle, 2017a).
2 FRM methodology and estimation
In this section we describe the methodology and algorithm used to compute FRM. Since
the penalization parameters are computed based on an L1-norm (LASSO) quantile linear
regression, this regression framework is introduced first. Within this framework, the
penalization parameter λ is exogenous. Since the FRM is distilled from the selected
penalization parameter, we subsequently discuss methods to select λ.
2.1 Linear Quantile Lasso Regression Model
Following Härdle et al. (2016), we introduce the quantile lasso regression model. Let m
be the number of macro variables describing the state of the economy, k the number of
firms under consideration, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Then p = k + m − 1 represents the number
of covariates. t ∈ {1, . . . , T} is the time point with T the total number of observations
(days). s is the index of moving window, s ∈ {1, . . . , (T − (n−1))}, where n is the length
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of window size. Then the quantile lasso regression is defined as:
Xsj,t = αsj + A
s,>
j,t β
s
j + εsj,t, (1)
where Asj,t
def=
[
M st−1
Xs−j,t
]
, M st−1 the m dimensional vector of macro variables, Xs−j,t is the
p − m dimensional vector of log returns of all other firms except firm j at time t and
in moving window s, αsj is a constant term and βsj is a p × 1 vector defined for moving
window s.
The regression is performed using L1-norm quantile regression proposed by Li and Zhu
(2008):
min
αsj ,β
s
j
n−1
s+(n−1)∑
t=s
ρτ
(
Xsj,t − αsj − As,>j,t βsj
)
+ λsj ‖ βsj ‖1
 , (2)
where λsj is the penalization parameter, and the check function ρτ (u) is:
ρτ (u) = |u|c|I(u ≤ 0)− τ |,
where c = 1 corresponds to quantile regression. The L1-norm quantile linear regression
can be used to select relevant covariates (other firms and macro state variables) for each
firm.
2.2 Penalization Parameter λ
Since Equation (2) has an L1 loss function and an L1-norm penalty term, the optimiza-
tion problem is an L1-norm quantile regression estimation problem. The choice of the
penalization parameter λsj is crucial. There are several options to select λsj , e.g. with
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) or using the Generalized Approximate Cross-
Validation criterion (GACV). Yuan (2006) conducted simulations and concluded that
GACV outperforms BIC in terms of statistical efficiency. Therefore, we determine λsj
with the GACV criterion in the FRM model and set λsj as the solution of the following
minimization problem:
minGACV (λsj) = min
∑s+(n−1)
t=s ρτ
(
Xsj,t − αsj − As>j,t βsj
)
n− df ,
where df is a measure of the effective dimensionality of the fitted model. The advantage
of GACV is that it also works for p > n, which can be important for the FRM if the
moving window size is small.
To compute the FRM, we perform the regression analysis as described above and select
the λs,∗j for each firm j using GACV. The Financial Risk Meter is defined as the average
lambdas over the set of k firms for all windows:
4
FRM
def= 1
k
k∑
j=1
λ∗j
3 Computational challenges and visualization
3.1 Data
To compute the FRM, we use data from 100 US publicly traded financial institutions as
well as six macro variables. The selection of financial companies is based on the NASDAQ
company list1 and based on the market capitalization. The selected companies are the
100 US publicly traded financial institutions with the largest market capitalization, see
Table 13 in Appendix.
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Figure 1: The x-axis represents the number of firms ordered by market capitalization and the y-axis
the percentage of total market capitalization.
FRM_per_cap
Initially, we used data on the 200 US publicly traded financial institutions with the
largest market capitalization to compute the FRM. However, the smaller companies in
this set change regularly over the time period under consideration (2007-2016) due to,
for instance, bankruptcies. This leads to obvious data download issues and therefore we
use only 100 firms. Figure 1 shows the cumulative market capitalization of US financial
firms. The x-axis represents the firms ordered by market capitalization and the y-axis the
cumulative market capitalization. We observe that the largest 100 firms cover more than
1See the NASDAQ webpage:
http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?industry=Finance
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85% of the total market capitalization of all companies in the US financial market and
we therefore can restrict our analysis to 100 firms. Furthermore, the results of estimating
the FRM based on 100 or 200 firms are very similar if the moving window size is the
same. Figure 2 plots both FRM series with the window size n = 126, the shape and the
trends of them are similar.
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Figure 2: FRM with 100 firms (black) and FRM with 200 firms (grey), moving window size n = 126.
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Figure 3: FRM with different moving window size, n = 63 (black) and n = 126 (grey), both series are
scaled into the interval [0,1], from July 6, 2007 until September 23, 2016.
FRM_compare_ws
We select six macro state variables to represent the general state of the economy: 1) the
implied volatility index, VIX from Yahoo Finance; (2) the changes in the three-month
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Treasury bill rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; (3) the changes in the slope
of the yield curve corresponding to the yield spread between the ten-year Treasury rate
and the three-month bill rate from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; (4) the changes
in the credit spread between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury rate from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis; (5) the daily S&P500 index returns from Yahoo Finance, and
(6) the daily Dow Jones US Real Estate index returns from Yahoo Finance.
To compute the FRM we employ the tail parameter τ = 0.05. To find the a stable window
size, n, we have to make a trade-off. We find that the lasso selection technique performs
worse if the window size is too small. Since we use daily data, the moving window size
should be larger than 50, so that the estimation for each window is more precise. The
results of using different window sizes (we have considered window sizes n = 63 (one
quarter) and n = 126 (half a year)) are shown in Figure 3. The larger the window size,
the more lagged, but also the smoother the plot is. Cross correlation can be used to
determine the time delay of a time series, which we apply here for the estimate of the
FRM with n = 63 and the FRM with n = 126. In Figure 4 and Table 1, the largest
autocorrelation between FRM with n = 63 and the lagged FRM with n = 126 is 0.967
from lag −29 to lag −22. We conclude that the FRM with n = 63 leads the FRM n = 126
by at least 22 periods. From all the preceding we set the moving window size to n = 63.
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Figure 4: Cross correlation between FRM with n = 63 and FRM with n = 126, where the number of
firms is 100.
FRM_compare_ws
For each firm we have 2, 386 daily observations and 105 covariates (99 firms and 6 macro-
state variables). The FRM is the average of the λ’s computed from the 100 individual
firms. The λ’s for the individual firms are more volatile and less smooth than the average
over 100 firms and therefore more robust to reflect the impact from financial events on
systemic risk. Figure 5 illustrates this by plotting the λ of firm Wells Fargo (the largest
firm by market capitalization) and the FRM.
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Lag -30 -29 -28 -27 -26 -25 -24 -23 -22 -21
Cross correlation 0.963 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.963
Table 1: Cross correlation between the estimates of the FRM with n = 63 and FRM with n = 126.
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Figure 5: FRM (black) and λ of Wells Fargo (grey), both series are scaled into interval [0,1], from April
5, 2007 until September 23, 2016.
FRM_compare_of
3.2 Computational challenges
We wrote a script to automatically download the data from Yahoo Finance and Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The R package quantmod is used. More details and the script
are available from Quantnet ( FRM_download_data).
The L1-norm quantile regression used to generate the λ series is computationally intensive
and therefore time-consuming, if applied sequentially for a large number of firms, see
for instance the code from Quantnet ( FRM_lambda_series). Therefore, we consider
parallel computing in R to reduce the computation time. R offers several algorithms for
performance computing, such as lapply, mclapply, parLapply, for and foreach 2. For our
purposes the foreach loops is the fastest solution, which we use for implementation.
We use the doParallel and foreach packages in R as developed and proposed by Calaway,
Weston, Tenenbaum and Analytics (2015) and Calaway, Weston and Analytics (2015),
see also Kane et al. (2013). Since we have 100 financial firms we use the foreach loops
twice: the first loop is for the 100 financial firms with the second loop nested in the first
loop to perform the moving window estimation. The speed of computation is increased
considerably, the script is available from Quantnet: FRM_parallel_compute.
2The webpage http://www.parallelr.com/r-with-parallel-computing/ provides an overview.
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Without the use of parallel computing, i.e. using a processor with four cores for each
moving window, it requires around two minutes to generate the FRM estimate for one
day. The Research Data Center (RDC) of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin has provided
access to their multi-core servers. Their servers have respectively 24, 32, and 40 cores.
By using these servers combined with parallel computing, the average computation time
is reduced approximately 12 seconds to obtain a daily value for the FRM. The FRM
webpage is updated weekly, which takes only 1 minute to generate the FRM series for
five working days.
3.3 Visualization
To implement the visualization of the FRM, we use the JavaScript framework D3.js (or
just D3 for Data-Driven Documents), which is a JavaScript library for producing dynamic,
interactive data visualizations in web browsers. The QuantNetXploRer is a good example
of D3 in power. More information about the D3 architecture, its various designs and the
D3-based QuantNetXploRer can be found in Bostock et al. (2011) and Borke and Härdle
(2017b).
Figure 6: The graph of Financial Risk Meter (FRM).
FRM_parallel_compute
Figure 6 illustrates the D3-based FRM visualization, and more examples e.g. for Asia,
Europe are available on Althof et al. (2019).
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 6 shows the FRM series from April 5, 2007 through September 23, 2016. The FRM
has no theoretical upper bound. In the time frame under consideration, the maximum
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value is 0.075, which occurred on December 15, 2008 and the mean value is 0.021. We
observe several peaks in the FRM series, which correspond to crises and other events in
these periods. Two peaks correspond to the financial crises in 2008 and 2010. The peak
in the first quarter of 2009 is at the height of the Great Recession: 800 thousand jobs
were lost and the unemployment rate rose to 7.8% in the US, which was the highest since
June 1992. Another peak around the fourth quarter of 2011 coincides with the decline
in stock markets in August 2011, which was due to fears of contagion of the European
sovereign debt crisis to Spain and Italy.
Therefore one may state that the peaks of FRM series identify financial events and their
impact on financial and systemic risk. The minimum of the FRM series in the time period
under consideration is observed in August 26, 2014, with a value of 0.009. This was a
relatively stable period.
3.3.2 Risk levels
For convenience and following the color scheme of US homeland security office we divide
risk into five levels with different classifications and colors. The levels of risk are defined
as different intervals of ratios for the FRM. These ratios are computed based on the past
values of the FRM. As shown in Figure 7, we have five levels of risk with five color codes.
The current risk level is determined by the ratio based on all past FRM observations into
which the current λ falls. Table 2 presents the risk levels as well as the colors, descriptions
and ratios of the risk levels.
Color Risk level description FRM ratio
Green Low risk of crisis in the financial market. <20
The incidence of a crisis is less likely than usual.
Blue General risk of crisis in the financial market. 20-40
There is no specific risk of a crisis.
Yellow Elevated risk of crisis in the financial market. 40-60
The incidence of a crisis is somewhat higher than usual.
Orange High risk of crisis in the financial market. 60-80
A crisis might occur very soon.
Red Severe risk of a crisis in the financial market. >80
A financial crisis is imminent or happening right now.
Table 2: Risk levels, color codes and ratios for FRM
As an example, on September 23, 2016 the value of FRM was 0.013. Since the maximum
of FRM series up to that date was 0.075, the ratio of this risk measure on September 23,
2016 was 17.3%. Since this is less than the 20%-ratio, we classify the risk on that day
10
Figure 7: Risk levels of FRM
as low risk of crisis in the financial market with color green. On the website the current
risk level is marked with a cross as shown in Figure 7 for this example.
4 Causality of FRM and other systemic risk mea-
sures
Zbonakova et al. (2017) analyze the factors affecting the value of λ and summarize that λ
depends on three major factors: the variance of the error term, the correlation structure of
the covariates and the number of non-zero coefficients of the model. Since high volatility
indicates high risk in finance and the number of non-zero coefficients is related to the
connectedness of the financial firms, they provide more theoretical evidence for the FRM
as a risk measure. In their application, they find a co-integration relationship between
λˆ and other systemic risk measures. We extend their idea and use Granger causality
analysis to validate FRM. We select three measures: VIX (see Hallett, 2009), SRISK (see
Brownlees and Engle, 2016) as well as the Google trends of the key word "financial crisis"
(see Preis et al., 2013).
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For the causality analysis we first need to introduce the Vector Autoregression (VAR)
model briefly. Lütkepohl (2005) proposes the VAR(P) model as follows:
yt = α + A1yt−1 + A2yt−2 + · · ·+ APyt−P + ut, (3)
where yt
def= (y1t, . . . , yKt)>, Ai are fixed (K ×K) coefficient matrices, ut is a K dimen-
sional process. The coefficients could be estimated by applying multivariate least squares
estimation. In order to perform the Granger causality test, the vector of endogenous
variables yt is split into two subvectors y1t and y2t with dimensions (K1×1) and (K2×1)
and K = K1 +K2. Then the VAR(P) model can be rewritten as follows:
yt =
 y1t
y2t
 =
 α1
α2
+
 A11,1 A12,1
A21,1 A22,1

 y1,t−1
y2,t−1
+ · · ·
+
 A11,P A12,P
A21,P A22,P

 y1,t−P
y2,t−P
+
 u1t
u2t
 (4)
The null hypothesis of the Granger causality test is that the subvector y1t does not
Granger-cause y2t, which is defined as A21,i = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , P . The alternative
hypothesis states that the subvector y1t Granger-causes y2t and is defined as: ∃A21,i 6=
0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , P . The test statistic follows an F distributions with PK1K2 and
KJ − n∗ degrees of freedom, where J is the sample size and n∗ equals the total number
of parameters in the above VAR(P) model.
4.1 FRM versus VIX
The VIX series is often addressed as a “fear index” and can be interpreted as a measure
for systemic risk (Hallett, 2009). For reasons of comparability, we standardize these two
series by setting the lowest value in the sample to zero and the highest to one. Figure 8
plots the standardized FRM series (thick black line) and the VIX series (thin red line).
The plot shows that both indicators move in the same direction, with the VIX series a
little more volatile. We also get some evidence of some financial events by observing the
corresponding volatility levels of the FRM and VIX. For example, in the end of 2008
there is a sharp upward trend of FRM, whereas the upward trends dominates VIX as
well, which corresponds to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008.
Both FRM and VIX have higher values between 2008 and 2010, which corresponds to the
time period of the financial crises. After 2013 the values of FRM are relative stable at a
low level, while there is similar pattern of VIX, which shows signs of the slow recovery of
the global economy from the recession.
Before we perform the Granger causality test, we test for stationarity of both time series
with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The results of the test are shown in
Table 3. For the FRM series, the p value is larger than 0.05, so we cannot reject the
null hypothesis, i.e. the FRM series may have a unit root and may be non-stationary.
We reject the null hypothesis for the VIX series with a p value smaller than 0.05 and
12
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Figure 8: Scaled FRM (thick black line) and VIX (thin red line)
FRM_VIX
conclude that the VIX series is stationary. We do not need to consider the co-integration
problem, since only if both series are non-stationary, we should take into account the
co-integration. There is a trade-off between using the original data and the transformed
(differenced) data to find the causality relationship. Sims (1980) prefers to use the original
data. He argues that VAR with non-stationary variables may provide important insights,
if one is interested in the nature of relationships between variables. Brooks (2014) also
states that differencing will destroy information on any long-run relationships between
the series. However, other people argue that the original non-stationary data might lead
to untrusted estimation, see Yule (1926) and Granger and Newbold (1974). In our case,
we consider both the original data and transformed data.
Series p values
FRM 0.28
VIX 0.01
DFRM 0.01
Table 3: p values of ADF test for stationarity
FRM_VIX
Firstly, we consider the original data. We choose the VAR order according to four crite-
ria: the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Hannan-Quinn information criterion
(HQ), the Schwarz criterion (SC) and the Prediction Error Criterion (FPE), see Ta-
ble 4. While HQ and SC suggest an order 3 VAR process, AIC and FPE suggest an order
20 process. We fit both VAR models with order 3 and order 20. Next, we check the
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Model AIC HQ SC FPE
FRM and VIX 20 3 3 20
DFRM and VIX 19 8 5 19
Table 4: Suggested order for VAR process by different criteria
Model Order VAR PT (asymptotic) PT (adjusted) BG ES
FRM and VIX
3 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16 1.1× 10−07 1.0× 10−07
11 2.5× 10−07 2.0× 10−07 1.6× 10−01 1.7× 10−01
20 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16 3.1× 10−08 4.1× 10−08
DFRM and VIX
5 2.2× 10−16 2.2× 10−16 3.2× 10−08 3.1× 10−08
8 6.7× 10−12 4.9× 10−12 1.4× 10−06 1.5× 10−06
11 2.3× 10−09 1.8× 10−09 1.5× 10−03 1.7× 10−03
19 1.7× 10−03 1.6× 10−03 5.5× 10−08 7.2× 10−08
Table 5: p values of model selection tests
Cause Effect p values
FRM VIX 4.0× 10−08
VIX FRM 6.1× 10−11
DFRM VIX 6.6× 10−11
VIX DFRM 8.7× 10−13
Table 6: p values of Granger causality test
FRM_VIX
autocorrelation of the residuals to decide the optimal order. Four tests are carried out:
the asymptotic Portmanteau Test, the adjusted Portmanteau Test, the Breusch-Godfrey
LM test and the Edgerton-Shukur F test. The null hypothesis of these tests is that there
is no first order autocorrelation among residuals. Choosing order 3 and 20 leads to the
rejection of all these tests (cf. Table 5). Subsequently we try the other orders and find
that with order 11 both the Breusch-Godfrey LM test and the Edgerton-Shukur F tests
are passed. Therefore, we select order 11. The autocorrelation function of the residuals is
plotted in Figure 9. Table 6 shows the results of the Granger causality test. All p values
are smaller than 0.05 which indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore,
FRM Granger causes VIX, and also VIX Granger causes FRM.
Next, we consider the transformed series. Since FRM is non-stationary, we take the first
difference. The transformed series is called as DFRM. In Table 3 we see that DFRM is
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Figure 9: Autoregression functions of FRM and VIX
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stationary. Then the same procedure as before is performed. While HQ suggests an order
8 process, SC suggest an order 5, and AIC and FPE both suggest an order 19 (cf. Table
4). After checking the four tests for autocorrelation of the residuals, we conclude that
the optimal order is 19. Although it does not pass the autocorrelation test, the p value is
close to the critical value 0.05, and the autocorrelation function confirms this result (cf.
Table 5 and Figure 10). The result of the Granger causality test is summarized in Table
6. We find that all p values are significantly smaller than 0.05, which indicates that the
null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore we conclude that DFRM Granger causes VIX, and
also VIX Granger causes DFRM.
4.2 FRM versus SRISK
SRISK is a macro-finance measure of systemic risk (Acharya et al., 2012; Brownlees and
Engle, 2016). Our data on SRISK for the US are obtained from V-Lab 3. We also
standardize SRISK, so that both series are comparable on the same scale. Figure 11
plots the standardized FRM series (thick black line) and the SRISK series (thin blue
line). We see that there is a peak in the first quarter of 2008 for SRISK, but afterwards
FRM and SRISK have similar patterns. Especially during the beginning of 2010 and the
beginning of 2012, the two series have a similar shape.
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Figure 11: Scaled FRM (thick black line) and SRISK (thin blue line)
FRM_SRISK
We perform the same procedure as in section 4.1. The results of the ADF test for the
SRISK series in Table 7 show that the series is non-stationary. Since the FRM series
is neither stationary, we consider the co-integration of them. From Granger (1988) we
know that if both series are co-integrated, then there must be Granger causality between
them in at least one way. We perform the Engle Granger 2-step test for co-integration,
which is suitable for bivariate time series. In the first step, the linear regression of FRM
3See the Systemic Risk Analysis Welcome Page: https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/
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Variables p-values
FRM 0.48
SRISK 0.10
Table 7: p values of ADF test for stationarity for FRM and SRISK
Explanatory (Cause) Response (Effect) Value of test-statistic Critical value at 5%
FRM SRISK -3.1 -1.95
SRISK FRM -2.7 -1.95
Table 8: Results of Engle Granger 2-step co-integration test
FRM_SRISK
on SRISK is carried out, i.e. FRM is the explanatory variable and SRISK the response
variable. In the second step, we test the residuals of the aforementioned linear regression.
If these residuals are stationary, then there is co-integration of FRM and SRISK. The
null hypothesis of this test is that the residuals are non-stationary. The result of this
test are summarized in Table 8. We conclude that FRM and SRISK are co-integrated, in
other words, FRM Granger causes SRISK. If we regress SRISK on FRM, i.e. SRISK is
the explanatory variable and FRM the response variable, we also conclude that SRISK
and FRM are co-integrated, which indicates that SRISK Granger causes FRM. We thus
conclude that there is mutual causality between FRM and SRISK.
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4.3 FRM versus Google Trends
Finally, we analyze the relationship between FRM and Google Trends (GT) for the key-
word "financial crisis". Google Trends provides data on the search volume of particular
words and phrases relative to the total search volume. This can be disaggregated by
countries. If a keyword is more frequently searched for, this might indicate a particular
interest. Preis et al. (2013) analyzed the data related to finance from Google Trends, and
find that Google Trends data did not only reflect the current state of the stock markets,
but may have also been able to forecast certain future trends. We use Google Trends
for the keyword "financial crisis", assuming that more people will search for this term if
they feel the risk for a financial crisis is high. The Google Trends data are weekly data.
To allow for comparison with the FRM we apply cubic interpolation to estimate daily
data from the weekly Google Trends series. This series is compared with the daily FRM
series. Figure 12 plots both the daily FRM series as well as the cubic interpolated Google
Trends daily series. Both series are standardized to the interval zero-one for comparison.
We observe some co-movement between both series, but no continuous superiority of the
Google Trends above FRM.
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Figure 12: Scaled FRM (thick black line) and Google Trends (thin green line)
FRM_GT
The ADF test shows that the GT series is stationary (cf. Table 9). We perform two tests
for the relationship between the two series. Firstly, we consider the original data of FRM,
then we consider the transformed data. We perform four criteria to find the optimal order
of VAR model. As the results in Table 10 show, all the criteria suggest an order 20 VAR
process. Therefore, we apply an order 20 VAR model. Next, the autocorrelation of the
residuals is tested. Although none of the tests can be passed (cf. Table 11), we have no
better choice for the order than 20. The autocorrelation function of residuals are plotted
in Figure 13. Table 12 shows the results of the Granger causality test. All p values
are significantly smaller than 0.05, which indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected.
Therefore, FRM Granger causes GT, and GT Granger causes FRM.
For the first differenced FRM, i.e. DFRM, the same procedure is used. In Table 10 all
18
the criteria suggest an order 20 VAR process. The result of the autocorrelation tests
are presented in Table 10. Although none of the tests is passed, we still use order 20.
The autocorrelation function of the residuals is shown in Figure 14. Table 12 shows the
results of the Granger causality test. All p values are significantly smaller than 0.05,
which indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, DFRM Granger causes
GT, and GT Granger causes DFRM.
Variables p-values
FRM 0.48
GT 0.01
DFRM 0.01
Table 9: p values of ADF test for stationarity for FRM and GT
Model AIC HQ SC FPE
FRM and GT 20 20 20 20
DFRM and GT 20 20 20 20
Table 10: Suggested order for VAR process by different criteria
Model Order PT (asymptotic) PT (adjusted) BG ES
FRM and GT 20 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16
DFRM and GT 20 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16 < 2.2× 10−16
Table 11: p values of model selection tests
Cause Effect p-values
FRM GT 1.1× 10−10
GT FRM 2.1× 10−12
DFRM GT 6.8× 10−11
GT DFRM 4.1× 10−10
Table 12: p values of Granger causality test
FRM_GT
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we propose and develop an AI based measure for systemic risk in financial
markets: the Financial Risk Meter (FRM). The FRM is a measure for systemic risk based
on the penalty term λ of the linear quantile lasso regression, which is defined as the
average of the λ series over the 100 largest US publicly traded financial institutions. The
implementation is carried out by using parallel computing. The risk levels are classified
by five levels. The empirical result shows that our Financial Risk Meter can be a good
indicator for trends in systemic risk. Compared with other systemic risk measures, such
as VIX, SRISK, Google Trends with the keyword “financial crisis”, we find that the FRM
and VIX, FRM and SRISK, FRM and GT mutually granger cause one another, which
means that our FRM is a good measure of systemic risk for the US financial market.
All the codes of FRM are published on www.quantlet.de with keyword FRM. The R
package RiskAnalytics (Borke, 2017b) is another tool with the purpose of integrating
and facilitating the research, calculation and analysis methods around the FRM project
(Borke, 2017a). The up-to-date FRM can be found on hu.berlin/frm.
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